U.B.C. Planning Papers

School of Community and Regional Planning

University of British Columbia
Vancouver, British Columbia

91-02617/

ISSN: 0828-2412

Pressure Group Politics and the Campaign to Protect South Moresby Island

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DP #22
December 1990

UBC PLANNING PAPERS
Discussion Paper #22

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Pressure Group Politics and the Campaign to Protect South Moresby Island

In July, 1988, an agreement was reached between the governments of Canada and British Columbia on a proposal to create a national park reserve on South Moresby Island, over the southern third of the Queen Charlotte Islands. The fifteen year debate leading to the protection of this 147,000 hectare wilderness encompassed a complex array of decision-making processes that involved multiple government, industry and public interests. The agencies, organizations and individuals that participated most intensely comprise what Pross (1986) terms "the policy community." As the conservation-versus-logging issue on South Moresby intensified from about 1978 on, native people and environmentalists found the planning procedures of the policy community increasingly inadequate. They took their concerns into the broader national and international milieu where they were met with support from a society apparently more in tune with the interest groups' priorities than with those of the industry-driven organizations at the inner core of daily policy-making.

Although the wilderness lobby was ultimately successful, there were costs as well as benefits in "going political." The growth of the South Moresby issue beyond the normal confines of the policy community into a highly politicized, national forum was a strategy of necessity rather than choice. A policy-making paradigm that precipitates such a difficult route to decision-making demands modification. Before investigating the dynamics of the South Moresby policy community - inside and out - the setting will be further described.

THE SOUTH MORESBY/GWAII HAANAS LEGACY

South Moresby is a 110 kilometre-long archipelago, a dagger-shaped triangle of islands at the south end of the Queen Charlotte Islands (Figure 1). The nearest settlements are well to the north, and access to Gwaii Haanas ("place of wonder" to the Haida) is by air and sea only. The area's isolated, high energy and nutrient-rich setting, containing extensive refugia from the most recent glaciation, has resulted in a high degree of endemism and an unusual abundance of wildlife. This biological legacy, sometimes known as the "Canadian Galapagos," includes the Queen Charlotte black bear, special alpine and subalpine areas, lakes displaying stages of stickleback evolution, high concentrations of raptors such as bald eagles and Peales peregrine falcons, and sea lion rookeries. Numerous sea bird colonies on

smaller islands have long been protected as provincial ecological reserves. Clean freshwater streams on South Moresby support a salmon fishery which is a major source of regional employment.

Key to the area's biotic richness is a diverse collection of mature ecosystems, including complex old growth forests which provide habitat for a large variety of organisms. While these ecosystems possess an inherent biological stability, their steep terrain is vulnerable to slope failure when ground cover is disturbed. Since the 1950s, forest management principles in B.C. have maintained that such risks should be taken into account, particularly where fish habitat is threatened by logging debris and sedimentation, and where logging practices are likely to make regeneration difficult. Despite these guidelines, "Clearcut forest harvesting and road construction in the Queen Charlotte ranges (which include all of South Moresby) have increased the frequency of natural slope failures by a factor of as much as 20, resulting in a decline in the viable forest land base and significant detrimental impacts on streams" (Grzybowski and Slocombe 1988, 473).

Dramatic alterations wrought to the Queen Charlotte Islands by Western civilization sharply contrast with the light imprint left by centuries of native use. Radio carbon dating at archaeological sites indicates occupation by the Haida up to 6,000 years before present. The Haida interpretation of their ancestry dates their occupancy of what they call Haida Gwaii back to "time immemorial". The bountiful resource base of the islands gave the Haida the time and inspiration to create their renowned artwork such as the totem poles at Ninstints - a UNESCO World Heritage Site within South Moresby.

Since the arrival of whites to the Queen Charlottes, the Haida population has been decimated by disease; much of their culture has fallen into disuse as a result of political oppression; and their lifestyle has been disrupted by foreign laws and resource exploitation. Recently, however, there has been a cultural revitalization (Grzybowski and Brown 1986). Traditional food-gathering activities continue, potlaches are frequent, and cultural and ecological ties to Gwaii Haanas are intensified. Moreover, "The Haida nation has never extinguished title to Haada Gwaii ... . To the Haida it is all Haida Land." (Resource Planning Team 1983, 15). A statement from the constitution of the Haida Nation best expresses the current Haida perspective: "The Haida Nation is the rightful heir to Haida Gwaii. Our culture, our heritage, is the child of respect and intimacy with the land and sea. We owe our existence to Haida Gwaii. The living generation accepts the responsibility to ensure that our heritage is passed on to following generations. Like the forests, the roots of our people are intertwined such that the greatest troubles cannot overcome us" (Yelthadaas 1988 15).

Less threatening to the native way of life than the European churches and developers were the recreationists who were drawn to South Moresby for its intricate shoreline, spectacular scenery, diverse marine environments and wildlife. Recreational activities include boat touring, sports fishing, hunting, kyaking, hiking and camping, soaking in hot springs, scuba and skin-diving, beachcombing, whale and bird watching and photography. These diverse attractions provide strong potential for tourism development, which has indeed burgeoned over recent years. Claims for economic benefits to be gained from wilderness-related tourism, used to counter the arguments for logging on South Moresby, have ranged from 100 jobs (National Parks and Conservation Foundation 1987, 37), to 180 jobs and $77 million in salaries for a ten-year period (Earthlife Foundation, quoted in Western Report July 1987, 7).

The forest industry has argued that tourism revenue cannot compete with the potential economies of logging on South Moresby. Forestry has been the modern economic mainstay of the Queen Charlottes, with tree growth rates there amongst highest in province. The Tree Farm Licence covering South Moresby, number 24, was granted to the ITT Rayonier Canada Limited (a U.S.-based multi-national company) in 1958. This licence covered 40% of South Moresby's land base, representing 11% of the timber available to the company. It was scheduled to be logged over a period of over forty years. Successive "crops" of trees would then be harvested at intervals of up to 80 years.

The second growth forests would not accommodate wildlife that depends on the old growth, and would not provide as rich a yield of timber. Forestry interests in B.C. downplay the first problem as they continue to "liquidate" the old growth that is accessible to them, while they share in the concern over declining supplies of wood. The drop in supply as the industry becomes increasingly dependent on second growth, already evident in some parts of the province, is termed the "falldown effect".

As with South Moresby's tourism potential, valuation problems are persistent in the estimation of the forest's economic worth. The B.C. economy has stood to gain anywhere from $2 million in provincial revenue to $75 million in direct and spin-off benefits annually, according to sources cited in Western Report (July, 1987). Job estimates range from 210 loggers and woodworkers (Western Report July 1987, 8), to 1,100 in a variety of logging-dependant jobs (President of Western Forest Products, cited in Baldrey and Fitterman 1985).

Considerable mineral potential for gold and complex iron-copper-gold-silver deposits has also competed with wilderness preservation objectives. As recently as 1986, mineral claims covered 24% of South Moresby. Offshore oil exploration around the Queen Charlottes has long been a possibility as well, and debates over the risks and merits of proceeding with oil development continue. Yet in the context of the fight for the protection of South Moresby Island, mineral and oil interests have had a low profile in comparison to forestry interests, both in government and industry.

Beyond the economic values of South Moresby's resources there lies an immeasurable mystique that is based in the area's ecological vitality, rich natural and human history, superlative beauty and wildness. The spirit of these islands, as reflected in the art of the Haida and of Emily Carr, holds a "power to play to the imagination and dreams of modern, urbanized man and to help motivate people on an individual basis" (Dearden 1988, 65). More tangible, but still unquantifiable, are the traditional and subsistence-oriented values most appreciated by the Haida. Furthest from economic values, perhaps, is "the belief that something should be allowed to exist in its own right and for its own sake" (Resource Planning Team 1983, 27) - a belief shared by the Haida and many environmentalists.

PROSS' POLICY COMMUNITY

The history of the battle over the riches of South Moresby is dominated by the complex and volatile interplay of entrenched pro-forestry forces and an increasingly vociferous wilderness lobby. Pross' (1986) theory of the policy community, supplemented with observations on environmental politics from Lowe and Goyder (1983), provides an appropriate foundation for interpreting the dynamics of this unfolding process.

"A policy community is that part of a political system that - by virtue of its functional responsibilities, its vested interests, and its specialized knowledge - acquires a dominant voice in determining government decisions in a specific field of public activity, and is generally permitted by society at large and the public authorities in particular to determine public policy in that field. It is populated by government agencies, pressure groups, media people, and individuals, including academics, who have an interest in a particular policy field and attempt to influence it" (Pross 1986, 98). In the present case, the "field of public activity" is forest land use decision-making for a specific region in the context of forest management in B.C.

The policy community has two parts: the sub-government and the attentive public. The sub-government is the core of the community with most of the responsibility for policy-making. In this case, the sub-government includes the B.C. Forest Service, certain provincial cabinet ministers, and forest industry representatives. Membership in the sub-government, because of the intensive degree of interaction involved, requires that groups have substantial resources to devote to activities such as participation on advisory committees and commenting on draft policies, and that they have strong organizational capabilities (Pross 1986, 98).

Surrounding the sub-government is the attentive public. "It includes any government agencies, private institutions, pressure groups, specific interests, and individuals ... who are affected by, or interested in, the policies of specific agencies and who follow, and attempt to influence, those policies, but do not participate in policy-making on a regular basis" (Pross 1986, 99). Some members of the attentive public are consulted by the sub-government and some are even allies of it. To maintain this status, groups must commit considerable institutional structures and resources to communication, and they must adhere to unwritten codes of conduct for moderate and discrete behaviour (Pross 1986, 98 and Lowe and Goyder 1983, 66). The rules of the game are largely determined by established laws and procedures which protect the status quo by bounding the policy-making process, keeping issues out of politics.

Groups that are "opposed to prevailing policy trends" (Pross 1986, 99), or "fighting interests which are well entrenched in government policy" (Lowe and Goyder 1983, 85) will likely reject the norms of the sub-government and will be excluded from its power and influence. In the case of South Moresby, most of the environmentalists and the Haida fit into this category. Often these groups will seek compensating power by attracting public attention through general debate - by getting issues into a political forum. To avoid the conflict and instability associated with wider debate, the sub-government may court members of the attentive public for their support, often with offers of token concessions; it may "run for cover" by delegating conflict resolution to special teams or administrative tribunals; and it may restrict discussion to a narrowly defined public.

From its "strategic territory between the sub-government and the public at large" (Pross 1986, 149-150), the attentive public has the power to force the emergence of issues from the policy community into the larger political system. In this "broader environment", issues of importance to the country at large are "resolved by the political leadership after full-dress debate in the media, Parliament, and often at intergovernmental meetings" (Pross 1986, 155). Once an issue enters this broader environment, members of the attentive public must be ready to deploy strategies and to exploit political channels quite different from those of use within the policy

community (Lowe and Goyder 1983, 61 and Pross 1986, 155). Under certain conditions these strategies might, in the end, precipitate change the rules of the policy community.

In the campaign for the protection of the South Moresby wilderness, participants both demanded, and took advantage of, the full range of opportunities for input to policy. As their strategies expanded, so did their support, from a local base, to a national and then international constituency. And with growth in support came the power to influence policy.

THE SOUTH MORESBY/GWAII HAANAS STORY

The discussion that follows traces the struggle for the protection of South Moresby from its roots in the forestry-oriented sub-government, through the mobilization of the attentive public, the decision-making activities of the policy community, and the dynamics of the debate in the broader environment, to the emergence of a new policy community. The strategies of the environmentalists and the Haida are examined and the advantages and disadvantages of participation in the policy-making process both inside and outside the policy community are assessed. Because events are not addressed in a rigid chronological order, major benchmarks are listed in historical sequence in an appendix for the reader's reference.

The Forestry Sub-Government

Pross (1986, 46) explains the evolution of cooperation between government and the forest industry in Canada as a function of government's need for economic development combined with industry's need for a long-term, assured supply of resources. This process began in B.C. in the late 19th century, when easy supplies of gold and fur-bearing animals had run out. To maintain its settlers the colony "gave away its [forest] resources on irresistible terms, granting what turned out to be perpetual rights of harvest" (Broadhead 1974, 125). In the 1940s the economic climate continued to favour close cooperation, as government expected companies to provide jobs, construction capital, management skills, and access to foreign markets. In the 1950s, under W.A.C. Bennett, the "giveaway traditions" became "deeply instilled in the bureaucracy. ... This has made the Forest Service the natural ally of the logging companies and traditionally all policy decisions were referred first to industry" (Helmer 1979, 2). Larger companies have been especially favoured, winning liberal terms for resource extraction from a provincial government that considers itself "partners with industry" (Marchak 1983, 40, 58, 354).

The form of the arrangement is the Tree Farm Licence (TFL). "A TFL provides a long-term or perpetual timber lease in return for which the licence holder, usually a large company, normally agrees to build a processing plant in the province and to take responsibility for managing the forest to achieve optimum value and to minimize waste," and to practise sustained yield (Pinkerton 1983, 71). Government in B.C. however, traditionally has not held companies to these obligations. In the 1980s, the under-regulation was blatant, as comments from a forestry consultant point out: "beginning in about 1981, the B.C. government initiated a policy of 'sympathetic administration,' which relaxed utilization standards in order to help forestry companies cope with the economic recession. Despite the fact that MacMillan Bloedel amassed record profits of $178 million in 1986, few believe the policy has changed" (cited in Banks 1988, 124).

Throughout the South Moresby debate Rayonier and its successor Western Forest Products (WFP) have maintained close communication lines with the provincial government, especially since the re-election of the Social Credit party in 1975. Media commentary on the debate describes the popular perception of this forestry sub-government: "To try to explain why the B.C. cabinet might be unwilling to face changes in the industry, or to protect South Moresby, critics ... have offered generalizations about Social Credit's affinity for the status quo, or suggestions that key cabinet ministers are closely tied to the industry" (Goddard 1986, 52). Such suspicions have been well nourished by forestry planning and regulation in the Queen Charlottes, where company amendments to logging plans in the 1970s received quick government approval (Helmer 1979, 2), and the benefit of the doubt with regard to reductions in the annual allowable cut (AAC) has generally been in the company's favour (e.g. McLaren 30 Dec. 1987). In the late 1970s the Queen Charlottes AAC was feared to be up to 50% too high. Attempts by the Public Advisory Committee to the Forest Service for the Queen Charlotte Islands to ensure a more realistic estimate of available timber, taking into account factors like soil stability and protection of other resources, met with frustration. (This Committee is discussed more fully later). In its efforts the Committee was denied access to inventory maps and its request to delay a major timber sale pending the recalculation was ignored (Helmer 1979, 2-3).

The Minister of Forests during most of the South Moresby debate, Tom Waterland, demonstrated an insensitivity to debate and other values in his support for the forest industry. During a boat tour of the area in 1984, he signed the guest book with a play on the words "clear-cut logging": "A clear-cut issue! A great forest resource!" (Goddard 1986, 46). Eventually, his connections with the industry were found to be unacceptably close. In January 1986, when it became public knowledge that he had investments in a tax shelter created to renovate two pulp mills owned by WFP and fed in part by wood from South Moresby, he resigned his position.

The effects on the forest resource of an underregulated industry are now obvious in B.C. Over one million hectares of land are not satisfactorily restocked, and flooding and landslides downstream from logging are common. The latter are well known in the Queen Charlottes, where logging practices have scarred the landscape for three decades. On Talunkwan Island, where logging began under Rayonier in 1969, logging road construction has caused landslides that have washed away entire hill sides and river beds, to the extent that "'Talunkwan' has since become a synonym for environmental ruin" (Goddard 1986, 51). In October 1979 landslides damaged several steep-slope, clearcut watersheds in the archipelago; charges laid against a company for logging on unstable slopes were later dropped. And "In 1982 the Forest Service released a report on the state of the Queen Charlotte [supply area] which revealed a rate of logging so blatantly unsustainable that it astonished even the small logging operators and local conservationists ..." (Broadhead 1984, 128). Despite such evidence, forest industry representatives insist that "The companies do protect the environment and not out of the goodness of their hearts," (Western Report 1987, 6). Their perception is that watchful government agencies keep them as responsible as need be. For decades, such claims were widely accepted by British Columbians. More recently, the attentive public has revealed sound forestry practice in B.C. to be far less common than the industry perspective suggests.

In May 1978 an opportunity arose for changes to legislation that could have checked the power of the forestry sub-government when a new Forest Act was introduced to the Provincial legislature. The Public Advisory Committee to the Forest Service called for the Act to provide for public hearings into all TFL

renewals, as: "a unique interval which would allow a review of the track record ... of the company, a removal of lands if necessary for other uses, and a careful assessment of methodology for the AAC calculations" (Helmer 1979, 3). Nevertheless, the Act passed in June provided for automatic renewal of Tree Farm Licences without public hearings and put most environmentalist priorities within the scope of the minister's discretion. During the debate the Minister of Forests defended this tack with unabashed support for the existing concentration of power in the sub-government: "I would rather that the decisions on rollovers (TFL renewals) be made on the basis of what is really best for the industry, and not through perhaps heated public debate" (Helmer 1979, 3). Clearly, this Minister's perspective of his constituency had become exceedingly narrow.

If legislation could not fetter the power of the forestry sub-government, neither could conservation-oriented government agencies which hold little sway over departments with industrial clientele in B.C. And native interests in this province are under-represented in the bureaucracy, with almost as little access to decision-making as they have in the sub-government. The Social Credit Government has steadfastly refused to discuss native land claims. In the face of such an unsympathetic administration it is not surprising that a rapidly mobilizing attentive public would eventually guide the South Moresby debate into a more overtly political environment.

Mobilization of the Attentive Public

Those members of the attentive public who oppose the policy decisions of the sub-government, who are excluded from its power relationships and disillusioned by its rules of operation, turn to a different set of strategies for influencing policy. Most of these are directed towards broadening the public debate on the issue at hand, consequently raising the intensity of the conflict and disrupting the communal atmosphere of the sub-government's decision-making process. Strategies mentioned by Pross (1986, 150) include building alliances with affinity groups, maintaining "a position in the community that enables [the group] to hear what is being said and to contribute to debate", and efforts to "'educate' not only the public at large but the policy community, and government decision-makers in particular, about certain problems and about the value of the alternatives available." All of these tactics and more are demonstrated by the activities of the attentive public in the South Moresby debate.

Early Activities of the Islands Protection Society and the Haida

In the fall of 1974 Rayonier presented a five-year logging plan proposing to move their contract logging operation from the denuded Talunkwan Island to Burnaby Island in South Moresby. The wilderness lobby that mobilized in reaction to this proposal was to maintain pressure on the provincial government for the next fifteen years.

A crucial first step in the wilderness campaign was the formation of the Islands Protection Committee (later, Society - IPS) at the initiative of Thom Henley, an environmentalist, and Gary Edenshaw (now Gujaaw), a Haida. "Those who formed Islands Protection were activists who had little faith in negotiations involving a few spokesmen meeting in private" (Pinkerton 1983, 75). While members like John Broadhead did keep up lobbying through personal meetings with business and government officials, the IPS only had good access to Ministry of the Environment staff, with the Forest Service being relatively inaccessible. This pattern is

consistent with Lowe and Goyder's (1983, 64) observation that major, development-oriented government departments were unreceptive to the involvement of environmental groups, while agencies with specific environmental mandates were most receptive.

The first public action of the IPS, with input from some Haida but without their official support, was to draft a wilderness area proposal that could be implemented upon the renewal of the lease on TFL 24. The proposal to preserve the area south of the Tangil Peninsula (South Moresby) as a wilderness area was then submitted to government.

Meanwhile, ready to mobilize on behalf of the Haida was the Skidegate Band Council, whose members felt that Rayonier's logging plans in an area particularly cherished for its traditional food-gathering values would "degrade the quality of the land and thus the quality of their lives" (Resource Planning Team 1983, 15). In their initial attempts to voice their concerns they hosted a feast for the provincial Premier and a meeting for the various parties to the conflict. The Premier responded by promising to place a five year moratorium on logging Burnaby Island, while permitting logging to proceed on Lyell Island - no less important an area in the eyes of the attentive public. The Haida did not commit their official support to the wilderness cause until 1979 (Pinkerton, pers. comm. 1990).

The next step taken by Thom Henley was to draft a petition calling for a moratorium on all logging in the Southern Moresby Wilderness proposal pending complete environmental impact studies. The main rationale for this demand was the lack of government prosecution of companies responsible for fish habitat destruction by logging-induced landslides on Talunkwan Island and elsewhere in the Charlottes. The petition, bearing 500 signatures of island residents, was taken to the provincial Legislature in February 1975.

The government's response this time was to promise consideration of the wilderness proposal by the Environment and Land Use Committee (ELUC) of Cabinet. In April 1975 ELUC instructed its Secretariat to prepare an overview study of the wilderness proposal; in July 1976 the Secretariat staff visited Moresby. Over the next year other provincial government agencies conducted supporting studies on the ecological and resource potential of the South Moresby environment. No findings or decisions followed upon these studies, while logging continued over the next several years, and damage to watersheds throughout the Queen Charlottes increased. In one instance, the IPS sponsored a court petition around charges against a company for logging on unstable slopes in another part of the Charlottes but was unsuccessful in this action.

With the objective of raising the awareness of residents of the Queen Charlottes about the negative impacts of logging, the IPS sponsored the Second All-Islands Symposium in November 1976, with the theme of "Resource Conflict in the South Moresby Wilderness Proposal." The conference served a purpose identified by Pross (1986, 152) in developing the strength of public opinion to which the sub-government may feel pressure to respond. Still, the IPS did not abandon other routes to influencing decision-makers, as demonstrated by its July 1983 delegation to Victoria to brief cabinet ministers on South Moresby's potential as a world class coastal tourist destination.

Taking the Minister to Court

At the other extreme from the peaceable lobbying of cabinet the IPS was involved in a strategy which came to be known as "taking the minister to court". Again, the use of this tactic is consistent with Pross'(1986, 171) expectations: "In Canada ... environmentalists have been particularly forward in using legal mechanisms for delaying and stopping developments they feel would degrade the environment. ... A community that finds it difficult to locate responsibility and to fix authority, and whose policy process is highly discursive, is almost forced to turn to law." The South Moresby policy community did follow this pattern.

In January 1979 a joint petition was filed in the Supreme court of B.C. by IPS, a native trapper, a Haida hunter-gatherer (Gary Edenshaw), and the non-native holder of a registered trapline - asking for a ruling which would ensure fair consideration of their interests by the Minister of Forests in the renewal process for TFL 24. A precedent in B.C. was set when all the petitioners except the IPS were granted standing. (The IPS continued to support the effort financially). The petitioners were in and out of court until 1980, when their case was finally dismissed. During this process, the Forest Ministry unsuccessfully attempted to withhold information, and to convince the petitioners to drop their action. The few concessions which were promised on the terms of TFL 24 were not reflected in the licence which was renewed for twenty-five years in May 1979 (Broadhead 1984, 134).

In contrast to this specific loss for the anti-logging interests there were several more general and substantive gains. In the final judgement the forest minister was ruled to have a duty to act fairly with regard to TFL replacement. This meant that interest groups were taken more seriously by the Ministry and had greater access both to information and to senior officials, and that the public could review and comment on forestry plans before they were finalized (Pinkerton 1983, 82). Essentially, the sub-government was told to cooperate with its attentive public. Furthermore, through newspaper articles and letters to the editor in local papers, the Queen Charlottes community had been educated by the attentive public on the failings of forestry policy, practise and regulation, and on the rights of the public to review important forest management decisions on crown land (Pinkerton 1983, 69, 82). Inevitably, the interest of the Islanders in the need for improved forest management was aroused, and with it, increased sympathy for the cause of the environmentalists.

Organization and Strategies of the Pro-Logging Community

Although many community members who protested logging practices in the Queen Charlottes were employees of the forest industry, the core of the non-native logging community in Sandspit did not join the critics. This group formed the 300-member Moresby Island Concerned Citizens Coalition, which favoured a mix of park and logging in the wilderness proposal area. The Queen Charlottes Chamber of Commerce arrived at a similar position. These opponents to the wilderness advocates had a relatively low public profile, despite rallies held in Sandspit in January 1986, and they felt ignored. In a manner typical of conflicting groups in the attentive public who do not understand each others' views, the industry supporters tended to stereotype their opponents (Pross 1986, 150), referring to environmentalists as "shrubs" and "tree huggers" (Western Report July 1987, 80).

Apart from attacking the credentials and conclusions of the wilderness advocates' research (Pinkerton 1983, 80), the companies themselves demonstrated

little public reaction to the opposition. With its inside track to the sub-government, and its affinity with the status quo, the industry probably felt the safer approach would be to avoid risking a defensive appearance in public view.

Building Alliances with Affinity Groups

In contrast to the loosely knit pro-logging lobby, the environmental groups were quickly forming alliances. Lowe and Goyder (1983, 85), like Pross, see alliance-building as important to the success of pressure group efforts: "The network of links between environmental groups lends further support and sanctioning power to the environmental lobby in its relations with government." The support sought by Henley and Broadhead beyond the IPS and the growing support of the Queen Charlottes community was both financial and strategic. One of the first non-local groups involved, the B.C. chapter of the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, opened a special trust fund specifically to channel funds for advocacy on the Queen Charlottes. The Western Canada Wilderness Committee concentrated on public education by producing over 500,000 copies of seven publications. Other early support came from the Sierra Club, the Friends of the Ecological Reserves, the Valhallas Society, the Federation of Mountain Clubs of B.C., and the Federation of B.C. Naturalists.

By the early 1980s strength of numbers in the South Moresby wilderness lobby was mounting, yet it was still small in comparison to the support that was to gather beyond the policy community, especially once the Haida began to attract national attention. Before examining the dynamics of the movement into the broader environment, some instructive experiences of the policy community remain to be reviewed.

The Policy Community at Work

"Those with a vested interest in established policy prefer to maintain its stability by 'organizing issues out of politics', ... by restricting discussion to a narrowly defined special public" in forums like advisory committees and panels (Pross 1986, 132, 98). The attentive public described above is this "special public" for South Moresby - the community in which the forestry sub-government would have to find support in order to achieve its goals. The consultative forums arranged in this case were the Queen Charlottes Public Advisory Committee to the Forest Service, the South Moresby Resource Planning Team and the Wilderness Advisory Committee. Advantages to be gained by interest groups like the IPC through participation in these forums included the opportunity to be heard by decision-makers, and access to "the advance intelligence and much of the information necessary to develop their criticisms of the course of official policy" (Lowe and Goyder 1983, 65). Potential costs were the resources spent on research, writing and meetings called for by the planning processes involved. While the three official forums described here were generally unsatisfactory in the view of the attentive public, the wilderness lobby did make gains in each case.

Queen Charlotte Islands Public Advisory Committee to the Forest Service

The Queen Charlotte Islands Public Advisory Committee (PAC) was formed in the spring of 1977 at the invitation of the Forest Service, on the same lines as other such committees in the province, to facilitate public input into forest management. Much of the following discussion of the PAC experience is based on a retrospective by

the Committee's chair, Rick Helmer (1979). The Committee had a slight non-industrial majority, with substantial industry representation.

Because of strong feelings for and against the South Moresby Wilderness Proposal amongst PAC members, discussions at meetings were volatile. Persistent questioning from the Forest Service regional manager as to which way a vote on South Moresby would go suggested to some members that if they supported the wilderness proposal they would not be credible in the eyes of the Forest Service (Helmer 1979, 4). In Lowe and Goyder's terms (1983, 66), these members sensed that they might forfeit their consultative status if they were too outspoken in their criticism of the status quo. As a result, members sometimes asked if the committee was "designed as anything but a politically safe way for "the environmentalists to blow off steam" (Helmer 1979, 2).

Several other factors discouraged the non-industry contingent as well. They felt that representation was uneven since some industry members were paid for their time while environmentalists were volunteers, and that non-local company interests stifled consideration of forest values other than timber. They found the Forest Service uncooperative in its refusal to lengthen the response time to new policy papers to suit the Committee's schedule, and in its refusal to provide access to the resource data required for meaningful analysis (Helmer 1979, Broadhead 1984). When the PAC supported the petitioners in their case against the Minister of Forests, the Forest Service tried to dissociate itself from the Committee, as had the industry: "In a letter to the Forest Minister ... Rayonier's chief subcontractor for TFL 24 dismissed the committee's decisions as "the most useless, non-constructive drivel" he'd ever heard. He concluded, "I assure you, the resolutions passed by this group are in no way the feelings of the vast majority of us" (Helmer 1979, 4).

In September 1979 a unanimous vote was taken for the dissolution of the committee at the call of the Forest Service. It had become clear to pro-wilderness members by that time "that the [Forest] Ministry had no real intention of educating the committee into any position of responsibility or of taking its recommendations seriously" (Pinkerton 1983, 78).

Despite its frustrations, the PAC made some contributions. It brought to light overharvesting on TFL 24; it clarified the role of public input into forestry plans; it led to the sharing of some industry expertise; it had exposed embarrassing ministerial restrictions on information availability, prompting the Forest Service to make some small concessions as a result; and it stimulated debate and education on forest management issues. Finally, industry was denied all grounds for argument about the credibility of their opponents. Critiques of management practices had become substantive and the critics themselves "began to look less like misguided radicals and more like knowledgeable citizens concerned with the long-term welfare of job-holders and the environment" (Pinkerton 1983, 80).

South Moresby Resource Planning Team

The ELUC Secretariat finally released its Overview Study in March 1979 as a result of the court action against the Minister of Forests. It supported the renewal of TFL 24 while calling for a 10 year moratorium on cutting in certain areas and for the formation of a South Moresby Resource Planning Team (RPT). Organized and administered by the Forest Service, the Team was to do a five-year study of land use options for South Moresby. It had representatives from the Skidegate Band Council, IPS, Western Forest Products, the Forest Service and the PAC. Its broad terms of

reference were "interpreted to convey a considerable amount of responsibility to the team" (RPT 1983, 22; Broadhead 1984, 135).

Through experiences similar to those of the PAC, the RPT was led to question the strength of this mandate. The Forest Service was again slow in responding to requests for information, and the Team had no way of ensuring that resource agencies would undertake the research that was required (RPT 1983, 22). In terms of public involvement the RPT aspired to a level of fairness which proved elusive because of administrative and political constraints (RPT 1983, 22). The Team recognized the mismatched economic ability of different interests to actively participate, but could not attain funding to correct this. As a further roadblock to fair process, a public meeting on the draft report was not allowed.

In the opinion of several participants, a process touted as a model of public involvement at the outset had degenerated into "a clever diversion by government of conservationist energies and a measure for avoiding embarrassing legal confrontations" (Broadhead 1984, 139). With comparative understatement, Lowe and Goyder (1983, 64) describe similar experience in Britain: "consultation of groups [by major, development-oriented government departments] was considered to be tokenism".

As in the case of the PAC, the tendency of the Team to favour conservation measures led industry to complain of bias and prompted the Forest Service to distance itself from the process - all government agency members were told to refrain from expressing their views on the issue of land allocation in public (Broadhead 1984, 139). Meanwhile, extractive activities were permitted to continue in the planning area; during deliberations extensive logging occurred on Lyell Island and mineral claims were staked over much of South Moresby. In his column in the Globe and Mail, David Suzuki described this conduct as "the height of hypocrisy and cynicism" (21 March 1987).

The South Moresby Land Use Alternatives report submitted to ELUC in 1983 presented four land use alternatives, from a resource development priority to a preservation priority. No action was taken to select amongst the options, until, in a political move in 1985, the Parks Minister and the Minister of Forests proposed a new option to Cabinet - "1-A," suggesting that most wilderness values should be foregone. The bias of the sub-government was still obvious in the Parks Minister's rationale: "Option 1-A is maybe the best kind of compromise. It won't satisfy those in favour of total preservation, but it likely will be accepted by logging and mining interests" (Goddard 1986, 46).

For the environmentalists, the main benefit of the RPT experience was the delay factor, which "allowed for five years of organizing and gathering support" under conditions of slowed logging activity (Broadhead 1984, 139-40). Again, Lowe and Goyder (1983, 60) have described this tactic in a broader context, suggesting that multiple points for intervention such as participation in planning processes "allow environmental groups to fight a protracted rearguard action against a development proposal that they oppose." And members of the RPT by no means restricted their efforts to that forum: "It was evident from the outset that many would continue to lobby government and make use of the media to influence opinion" (RPT 1983 25).

Wilderness Advisory Committee

The appointment of the Wilderness Advisory Committee (WAC) in November 1985 paralleled another technique identified by Pross for "organizing issues out of politics", that of "delegating conflict resolution to administrative tribunals" (Pross 1986, 132). Lowe and Goyder (1983) suggest that interest groups may seek committees of inquiry because they signify official acceptance that there may be cause for concern and they hold the possibility for authoritative endorsement of a group's views, forcing a response. In the case of the WAC, most environmentalists held Pross' more sceptical perspective as to government motives, because the Committee did not have the legal powers of a commission, logging on Lyell Island was at first still allowed to continue, Committee membership was biased towards industry, the reporting period of three months was impractical, and uncertain terms of reference meant that even existing parks might be threatened.

Created by the province's Environment Minister, the WAC was to review sixteen controversial park proposals and reassess the boundaries of eight existing parks. Although the Committee sought public input, many environmental groups boycotted the process because of their skepticism regarding its legitimacy - an attitude which was exacerbated by levels of polarization and frustration that had been mounting through previous, apparently futile, planning exercises. Now it was Cabinet that was seen to be delaying the decision-making process, with an election on the horizon (Vancouver Sun 19 Oct. 1985). Nevertheless, some groups took the opportunity to channel their concerns to government. In a tidy example of adaptive environmentalist strategy, Broadhead and Henley divided their efforts, with Henley boycotting the process and Broadhead participating.

In March 1986 the WAC recommended that the majority of South Moresby be preserved but that logging continue on Lyell Island (except in a 675 hectare ecological reserve to be established at Windy Bay) and on three smaller islands. It also suggested that "The Provincial Government should offer Parks Canada the opportunity to create a national park on South Moresby," with the agreement to be made within two years (WAC 1986, 34). The report was generally accepted by industry and condemned by wilderness advocates, including the Haida and the IPS. Commitment of the latter to the South Moresby wilderness was by this time so strong that satisfaction with anything short of full protection would not be attainable.

Dynamics of the Broader Environment

The issue of wilderness versus logging on South Moresby had to expand beyond the policy community on two accounts. First, the issue had become "too important to the country at large to be left in the hands of a small number of government agencies and their associated interests" (Pross 1986, 155). Second, disagreement between interests within the policy community had become so severe that resolution could only occur in the larger political system (Pross 1986, 154). Usually it is the attentive public that makes obvious these conditions and precipitates the transition of debate into the broader environment. In cases like South Moresby, groups resort to this strategy when their access to the sub-government has been limited and their views have not been fairly accommodated in the consultative process (Lowe and Goyder 1983, 61): "[The official] route to political motivation had not worked. It was ... a trap of public participation, countless bureaucrats, committees, reports and recommendations, all of which could be, and were, ignored by the politicians" (Dearden 1988, 68). Having "escaped the policy community" the attentive public

must then be prepared to employ a new set of strategies, suited to the goal of political motivation through public support and appropriate to national and international settings, from mass media to parliament and intergovernmental negotiations. Wilderness proponents in the Moresby case made the transition most successfully. Haida and environmentalist strategies are discussed below in turn.

Haida Strategies

In the years prior to the nationalizing of the South Moresby debate the land claims issue had been dropped from public discussion, largely in response to behind-the-scenes disagreement over tactics and the confusion of non-Indians on the subject of claims (Pinkerton 1983, 78). Yet from the Haida perspective, the battle to protect the wilderness has always been inseparable from their struggle for recognition as an Indian Nation. Their position on ownership of Haida Gwaii, conveyed to the federal government in 1981, is based "not only on the fact that they are the original occupants of the Islands, but also on the assertion that they have a moral obligation to manage the resources of the Islands more responsibly than the provincial government and the lease-holding companies have done" (Pinkerton 1983, 78).

Through "taking the Minister to court" the Haida had earlier become well educated on forestry policy and practice, and under Grand Chief Percy Williams, they took on a more active role in criticizing the industry (Pinkerton 1983). When permission was granted to WFP to log Lyell Island early in 1985 the Skidegate Band Council conveyed a fully-informed expression of concern to the Forest Service. In October 1985, the President of the Council of the Haida Nation, Miles Richardson, related to the press the frustration of his people after twelve years of fruitless negotiations and threatened a less peaceful approach: "We will not be pushed aside in our own homelands and told that our interests are not worthy of consideration with all the other interests in this province. If we must take this into our own hands, that's what we will do" (Bohn 26 Oct. 1985).

That month the Haida began their blockade of logging operations on Lyell Island, despite a court order not to interfere with the loggers. First the elders and then younger Haida lined up in the rain, at the start of a logging road beside a stream that had been destroyed by logging, and faced arrest by the RCMP. By agreement the Haida stood alone, with environmental, church and labour groups waiting to move in when needed (Fournier 28 Oct. 1985). This strategy gave the land claims issue centre stage and prevented the B.C. Government from lumping natives and environmentalists together in the minds of voters (Broadhead quoted in Goddard 27 Nov. 1985). The risk of stereotyping the wilderness advocates as opportunistic and self-interested by an uninformed public was thus minimized. Also, the more tightly controlled approach prevented the potential disruption of the carefully orchestrated act of non-violent civil disobedience.

By the end of the blockade in November, seventy-two Haida people had been arrested and eleven of them charged with contempt of court. Although they were told by the judge to apologize or face imprisonment they refused and eventually went free - some were given suspended sentences and for others charges were dropped.

From the perspective of the wilderness lobby, the blockade was a success qualified only by the hardship suffered by those who braved cold and arrest and by the financial burden assumed by the Haida and their allies. Through extensive media coverage it carried the South Moresby cause far afield, raising support from the general public and fueling coalitions among interest groups. The blockade also

caught the attention of politicians, leading to meetings with federal and provincial cabinet ministers and prompting the federal government's first direct intervention in the affair. The Ministers of Environment and Native Affairs both offered to assist in the resolution of the dispute by urging the provincial government to negotiate with the Haida (Vancouver Sun 22 Nov. 1985). Last but not least, the blockade was "an important spiritual occasion. The clouds of disease and alcohol and foreign ideas parted and the ancient spiritual forces were touched once again" (Grzybowski and Brown 1986, 16).

In the view of some Haida the failure to sentence those arrested was evidence that "Gwaii Haanas was not Canada's private playground. The Haida Nation was well within her rights to defend her home" (Yelthadaas 1988, 15). However this small symbol did not come close enough to the acknowledgement of nationhood that the Haida were looking for. Chief Justice McEcheon stated that, as Canadian citizens, the Haida had no moral or legal rights to stop the logging, and in July 1986 the Forest Minister again gave the go-ahead to log Lyell Island. The mounting frustration of the Haida was demonstrated by the renouncement of Canadian citizenship by nine of their people (Broadhead, pers. comm. 1990, Parfitt 15 July 1986). And in 1989, the Haida withdrew from the official land claims process and announced that they would issue their own passports and "govern their island homeland as an independent country" (Glavin 31 Jan. 1989). The rules of the land claim process, aiming ultimately for the surrender of title, were so unpalatable to the Haida that they refused to be any part of a policy community that would abide by them. As discussed later, the Haida are now bargaining for new rules for the management of Gwaii Haanas.

Environmentalist Strategies

New points of access to policy-making used by interest groups in the broader environment include parliament and the first ministers, international public opinion, the courts, and intergovernmental negotiations (Pross 1986, 165). Environmentalists for South Moresby had used the courts within the policy community and the Haida had used them in the national setting. Both groups used the other avenues of influence in the broader environment; here these strategies will be reported from the environmentalist perspective, because they increasingly focus on a target in itself of little interest to the Haida: the establishment of a national park. Only a sampling of the environmentalist strategies can be related here - the full recording of the grassroots effort and an accurate account of the commitment of the many individuals involved is impossible in the space available. A forthcoming book on South Moresby by one central actor, Elizabeth May, will likely move further in that direction.

Alliance-building continued through the 1980s with growing involvement of national conservation groups including the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, the Nature Conservancy of Canada, the World Wildlife Fund (Canada), the National Audubon Society and the Canadian Nature Federation. Endorsement from these groups and other organizations represented the support of anywhere from 300,000 (Dearden 1988) to one million (McCrory, pers. comm. 1990) people. In 1983 the Pulp and Paper Workers of Canada Union demonstrated their support by electing South Moresby as their environmental cause of the year. One national group specifically devoted to mobilizing wider public support for the cause was the celebrity-studded Save the South Moresby Area Committee. Its members included David Suzuki, Robert Bateman, Farley Mowat, Pierre Berton, Margaret Atwood and Lorne Greene. This group's contribution was inconsistent (Dearden 1988, 68) and largely symbolic. Atwood established a fund to raise what she called Premier

Vander Zalm's "ransom" money for the park and donated the first $1,000. Bateman offered to donate the proceeds from the sale of one of his lithographs (Western Report 1987, 8). Bruce Cockburn contributed the proceeds of a concert to assist with the court costs of the Haida.

On site, the commitment of various influential Canadians was bolstered by guided trips through the islands on a large yacht, the Darwin Sound II, which easily demonstrated conservation and tourism values. Haida artist Bill Reid also became a vocal proponent of the wilderness and spiritual values of South Moresby.

International support came from both government and non-government conservation organizations. UNESCO's designation of Anthony Island as a World Heritage Cultural Site in 1981 and the lobbying for nomination of the remainder of South Moresby for classification as both a Natural and Cultural Heritage Site lent international prestige to the wilderness involved. Vickie Husband of the Sierra Club of Western Canada and Tom Henley worked hard to gather support in the U.S. (McCrory, pers. comm. 1990). An International Committee to Save South Moresby was led by the President of the U.S. National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA). With the support of other major U.S. groups, this Committee placed increasing pressure on the federal and provincial governments to negotiate an agreement for a park on South Moresby (NPCA July/August 1987, 36). Pressure was also exerted on the provincial government by the National Parks and Recreation Subcommittee of the House of Representatives.

This massive mobilization of support for the wilderness cause depended largely on the capturing of media attention. Both Pross (1986, 154) and Lowe and Goyder (1983, 85) acknowledge the importance of this route to influencing public opinion and generating wider participation in the policy process. Lowe and Goyder (1983, 85) expressly link the dependency of environmental groups upon media contacts to their need to compensate for their initially weak position with respect to interests that are well entrenched in government policy.

The proficiency of the interest groups in staging media events (a necessary skill according to Pross, 1986, 158) was well demonstrated by the Save South Moresby Caravan which crossed Canada by train in 1986. Organized largely by the Canadian Nature Federation with the help of John Broadhead, the caravan included Haida delegates and stopped in each city to hold rallies and generate support (Canadian Nature Federation 1987, 12). Numerous public demonstrations focusing on South Moresby were held in B.C. at the peak of the campaign.

A key component of the publicity effort was a book produced by the IPS at the initiative of Henley and Broadhead. An award-winning blend of natural and political history and an appeal for protecting the area, Islands at the Edge (IPS 1984) reached a broad readership. Supplementing the book were posters and tabloids produced by the Western Canada Wilderness Committee in runs of 150,000. Financial support engendered by this publicity was channeled to the IPS. From 1976 on, articles about South Moresby appeared in several high profile periodicals and newspapers, including Nature Canada, MacLeans, National Geographic, the New York Times, the London Observer and the New Yorker Magazine. By the end of the campaign every Canadian newspaper had carried at least one story on South Moresby and some had made a policy to print all the news on the issue that came to hand (McCrory, pers. comm. 1990). Virtually all newspaper editorials supported a stop to logging. Major television and film programs were produced on the issue, including three episodes of David Suzuki's CBC documentary, the "Nature of

Things," which supported the environmentalist view. Such coverage made South Moresby a household term across Canada.

Clearly, strong links were established between environmental groups and the media over the South Moresby issue, leading industry to claim that most publicity was unfair. Indeed, it is a common complaint of industry in B.C. that media coverage of natural resource issues is inadequate and biased towards environmentalists. Accordingly, the forest industry has mounted some controversial publicity efforts of its own, under the slogan of "forests forever". And the publicity wars are only beginning, if Lowe and Goyder's (1983, 59) prediction proves true, that "media receptiveness to environmental issues is likely to be more than a passing fashion."

In addition to the media, the point of access to policy most used by the environmentalists at work in the broader environment was the lobbying of federal politicians. In the area of intergovernmental negotiations, so important to the Moresby case, it has been suggested that interest group participation can be constrained by the mechanics of the process (Richard Simeon in Pross 1986, 165). Yet the South Moresby wilderness proponents, through political astuteness, had a major influence on federal-provincial negotiations. As reported in the Globe and Mail (McLaren 9 Jan. 1987): "The federal Government is not exerting enough financial and moral pressure on British Columbia to prevent the logging of some of the world's oldest trees on Lyell Island, the Canadian Nature Federation and other conservation groups say. ... Ottawa could still wield a much bigger financial stick ...." Much of the lobbying that went on was "inside," involving the recruitment of people with important business and political contacts to support the cause behind-the-scenes (Dearden 1988, 64). As an example of the direct lobbying conducted by the environmentalists, late in the evolution of the issue when the province was insisting on the continuance of logging, a delegation of key players arranged a meeting with Minister of the Environment Tom MacMillan to call for increased pressure on the province. This delegation included David Suzuki; the Reverend Peter Hamil, a representative of supporting church groups; Paul George of the Western Canada Wilderness committee; Vickie Husband of the Sierra Club; Member of Parliament Mr Fulton; Minister MacMillan's assistant, Elizabeth May; Colleen McCrory of the Valhalla Society; John Broadhead; and Thom Henley (McCrory, pers. comm. 1990). Building on the momentum of the interest generated by the Haida blockade, interest groups were also able to use public avenues to get federal members of parliament like Fulton and the Speaker of the House, John Fraser, to lobby for them.

As a result of these efforts, federal interest grew from the time of the 1984 election campaign onwards. Members of the new conservative Government, notably MacMillan and Fraser, began to put pressure on the province to protect South Moresby as a park. (Since 1976 the area had been in Parks Canada's system plan as a Natural Area of Canadian Significance to be considered as a potential national park.) The federal opposition supported the Government's stand. NDP environnment critic, Jim Fulton, actively advocated conservation measures, and Liberal environment critic Charles Caccia complained that "the political will in Victoria is comparable to that of a jelly-fish" (Bohn 1 Nov. 1985). Starting early in 1985, signals came from B.C. that the province would be interested in discussing a park with Ottawa, but not until May 1986 were negotiations ready to begin (Vancouver Sun 21 May 1986). In the eleventh hour of the debate, a last barrage of public pressure on the Provincial Government was orchestrated by Colleen McCrory and Elizabeth May. For two days telegram and telephone lines to the Provincial Parliament were virtually monopolized by pleas to save South Moresby (McCrory, pers. comm. 1990).

A New Policy Community Emerging

As players in the policy community and its broader environment moved towards a resolution of the forestry versus wilderness issue, the objectives and roles of the participants began to shift. In the face of a pro-wilderness decision, the last main task of the forestry sub-government in the context of South Moresby was to ensure the most lucrative compensation arrangement possible, in terms of economic benefits both for the province and for the industry. The wilderness protection task in the main was passed from the environmental groups to the Canadian Parks Service (CPS) and the native people. Uncomfortable co-workers, these latter are at the time of writing still establishing the rules for what is to become the new sub-government for South Moresby. The attentive public waits and watches the new game emerging in an uneasy peace.

Reaching Agreement

From 1986 to 1988 the federal and provincial governments tangoed their way through a negotiation process rife with stalemates. Time and again discussions broke down or agreements fell through as new demands were placed on the table and complications became apparent. The province had to be convinced that the boundaries of the national park should include the whole South Moresby wilderness and that no logging could continue within that area. Economic benefits had to be worked out to compensate for lost forestry development. And the amount of compensation to be paid to the company and its employees had to be determined. The last issue proved to be the most thorny, with industry demanding far more than was foreseen and the two governments bargaining over what proportion of the settlement each would pay. Ultimatums were posed and forgotten; offers were made, rejected, modified and made again; and positions shifted in mysterious ways, largely driven by behind-the-scenes lobbying. The responsibility for negotiations was passed up the political ladder from environment ministers to the deputy prime minister and the premier, and finally, in a telephone conversation said to have clinched the deal, to the prime minister and the premier.

In July 1987 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed and after a year of complex negotiations, a Memorandum of Agreement was finalized on July 12, 1988. The following elements were included in the Agreement: 147,000 hectares of B.C. Crown land would be transferred to the federal government for the purposes of a national park reserve; the federal government would pay for all park operations and development as well as $23 million to compensate logging interests, $50 million for a regional tourism and small business development fund and $12 million for reforestation and forest management projects in the Queen Charlotte Islands region; and the province would pay $12 million for forest management and $8 million for industry compensation. The province also agreed in principle to the creation of a national marine park in the region. The regional development fund would be administered by a joint federal-provincial committee as support for the Queen Charlotte Islands Regional Economic Development Initiative, to ease adjustment to a tourism based economy. All expenditures under the agreement are required to be guided by principles of sustainable development.

Park Planning Initiatives

From the first official park proposal, by the Wilderness Advisory Committee, a strong role for the Haida in park management was envisaged (WAC 1986, 36). While this was not stipulated in the final agreement, Minister of the Environment MacMillan gave assurances that the Haida would be involved at every stage and would take a leading role in interpreting the park and presenting it to the public (Glavin 30 Jan. 1988). At the signing of the Agreement, Fisheries Minister Siddon said he expected to put forward a plan by March 1989 that would be acceptable to the Haida for its innovative and promising qualities (Glavin 13 July 1988). For the CPS representatives at the new B.C. Projects Office in West Vancouver, this target has so far proven unattainable.

The administrators of the South Moresby/Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve are faced with two conditions which to date have proven to conflict with one another. First, as reflected in the "park reserve" status, the park designation is not supposed to prejudice native land claims, and native interests in the area are to be accommodated. Second, because arrangements for the Park Reserve are part of the larger Agreement, CPS management has to begin within a reasonable time frame in order for the land not to revert back to the province by default. The new policy issue is the challenge of managing the Park Reserve for the usual national park values of conservation, recreation and education without prejudicing land claims and with full respect for the historic and current interests of the Haida.

During a year of negotiation for a Memorandum of Understanding on Park Reserve management, the Haida have been demanding far-reaching responsibilities including veto power over all significant decisions, and the CPS has been seeking a consensus approach to decision-making, backed by legislation stating in which areas of management either Parks or the Haida have final say. Even with an "innovative" approach, involving "delegation" to the Haida of historical and cultural interpretive responsibilities, traditional resource harvesting rights, and management of ceremonial activities, the CPS has found it cannot satisfy the Haida demand for final authority without abrogating its park management mandate (Thompson et al. 1989).

Redefining the Rules of the Game

The Haida's stand on the park reserve, as reflected in the press, has varied from acknowledgement of the need to work out details of "coexistence" (O'Hara 1988) to refusal to recognize the Park Reserve until a formal agreement is signed (Kavanagh Feb 1989). The opposition to the Park Reserve stems from: a conviction that the protection of Gwaii Haanas can only be assured under the jurisdiction of the native people; a vital interest in ensuring the protection of the Haida right to hunt, trap, fish and gather food; and a fear that their position on ownership of the land will be compromised by its park reserve status. Without explicit recognition in the park management agreement of the dispute over title or at least provision for a way of dealing with the dispute, the Haida cannot be assured that their position will not be jeopardized, despite the special designation of park reserve. The CPS replies that such a provision would be beyond its jurisdiction (Thomson et al. pers. comm. 1989).

The Haida position on the matter of authority over Gwaii Haanas is not softening. Miles Richardson has stated: "We didn't stand in the way of Lyell

Island to have a national park shoved down our throats. ... Our objective - preservation - has been won. In the meantime it's our responsibility to manage South Moresby. Anything they (CPS officials) do, they do with our consent. It's simple" (Glavin 30 Jan. 1988). To demonstrate the strength of their convictions the Haida have threatened to close the area to tourist traffic (Richardson, quoted in Glavin 13 July 1988), and they charge visitors to the area $25 for travel permits, as they have since 1982. While Canadian authorities have asserted that there are no legal grounds for this fee, visitors and tourist companies respect the permit system, implicitly supporting the Haida's demands (Ottawa Citizen 2 Feb. 1989).

An Uneasy Peace

Recently, the CPS has reached agreement with Haida negotiator, Gujaaw, on a proposal for the cooperative management of the area that would be precedent-setting in terms of the opportunities it maintains in the absence of a land claim agreement. In a surprise visit to Moresby Island in April 1989, Environment Minister Bouchard discussed matters with Richardson and Haida elders (Howard 19 April 1989). The written management proposal is now under consideration by the Haida Assembly.

As low-profile discussions of park management and land claims continue, resource exploitation proceeds in the Queen Charlottes under the watchful eye of an attentive public now well-educated on environmental themes. Discussion of potential oil and gas exploration around the archipelago and especially in the proposed marine park area is kept in public view by critics from Greenpeace, a group that had a lower profile in the wilderness issue (Parfitt 8 Nov 1988). Environmentalists monitor activity related to mineral claims in the Park Reserve and nearby.

Since the resolution of the forestry-versus-wilderness debate, environmental groups and the Haida have been able to take on more constructive, pro-active roles as well. Colin Richardson coordinates an organization called the Haida Gwaii Watchmen, which is developing the Haida's economic interest in tourism and the caretaking of ancestral village sites. Thom Henley established a program called Re-discovery on Graham Island, which helps native and other youth to get in closer touch with nature and the traditional skills of their people. John Broadhead, from his home in the Charlottes, is directing research by the Earthlife Foundation on policy structures that would prevent the kind of environmental degradation which precipitated the South Moresby conflict and would improve the decision-making process. On Lyell Island, the Haida and the CPS are making progress towards reforestation, repairing the damage done by past logging operations.

Still, pending the settlement of management arrangements for the Park Reserve, there is a disquieting sense of uncertainty in the Queen Charlotte Islands. While the Haida recognize that they have friends in the non-native population (Burns 15 Aug. 1987), a mounting tension divides the two cultures. In order to be seen to be unbiased, the CPS representative in the area spends half his time in Sandspit and half in Skidegate. Sandspit residents formerly employed in logging are anxious to benefit from park development and feel ill-at-ease because of the Haida claim to ownership. Richardson's reply to these concerns reiterates his unwavering message: "But this is Haida Gwaii. The difference between us is that we feel at home because this is our home, unquestionably. ... Not until the Canadian government formally negotiates with the Haida to bring their home within Confederation will the issue be closed. ... We never treatied. We have never signed away this land. And until this relationship is established, there's going to be conflict" (Glavin 23 Feb. 1988).

Like Broadhead, Richardson has set his sights on new rules for policy-making in a different kind of policy community. Broadhead looks to promising institutional innovations in New Zealand and elsewhere for models; Richardson's vision harkens back to an arrangement that worked for Haida Gwaii from time immemorial until the recent arrival of the whites.

CONCLUSION

With ingenuity, adaptiveness and dedication, the attentive public was able to follow the path of conflict resolution from the offices of the sub-government through the meeting rooms of the planning committees, into the national arena of parliament and the media. When the channels of consultation and negotiation with agencies inside the policy community failed, the campaign entered the broader environment; yet earlier tactics were maintained so as to exploit all the lobbying opportunities available at any given time. Strategies co-ordinated by key participants tapped the resources of a diverse array of interest groups. The Haida people were no less resourceful than the environmentalists, and their campaigns intersected and complemented one another.

Overall, the South Moresby story supports the patterns of political activity described by Pross and by Lowe and Goyder. These policy dynamics are reviewed below, and the "ins and outs" of the policy community are evaluated.

Inside the Policy Community

Environmental groups working within the policy community in cooperation with the sub-government experienced the benefits of increased access to information, some influence on smaller decisions, and the opportunity to delay unwanted development. But these gains were not without their associated costs.

The most obvious costs are those of the person-hours and dollars that enable the close interaction of interest groups with members of the sub-government. Pross (1986, 174) emphasises the organizational factor - "To participate, groups must organize themselves along bureaucratic lines," and he observes that bureaucratic strategies incur expenses, such as those of expertise, lobbying, participation in advisory committees, conferences, travel, communication, legal advice and the use of the courts. Indeed, in the Moresby case, "Raising finances was a constant and debilitating chore throughout the campaign" (Dearden 1988, 70). The burden of maintaining institutional resources is heavier for groups that do not represent economic interests and therefore lack a strong financial base, such as environmental groups as opposed to industry or labour organizations. Furthermore, industry proponents in processes like inquiries, commissions and committees are often able to write off their costs as deductions from income or as direct tax credits. Their costs are thus covered in part by the public purse, which also covers government costs. Only the environmental non-government organizations are obliged to raise funds entirely on their own resources. As was seen in the South Moresby team planning efforts, this puts representatives from the environmental groups at a participatory disadvantage.

While organizational constraints are undoubtedly a significant factor in the ability of the attentive public to influence policy, the South Moresby experience suggests that the rules for interaction with the sub-government present as severe a limitation. In brief, this "unwritten code of moderate and responsible behaviour"

(Lowe and Goyder 1983, 66) asserts: know and use a certain language and stay within the bounds of existing institutional arrangements ("don't be disruptive"); do not demand too much deviation from the status quo ("be reasonable"); do not be outspoken in public criticisms ("don't stir controversy"); and respect confidentiality, if necessary by keeping certain information from the public ("co-operate"). For environmental interest groups these rules run against an ethic of open communication with the public and present the danger of co-optation: a group may serve the interests of its opponents more than its clientele by providing them with useful information and with the opportunity to claim that fair process has been followed. Scarce resources are ill-spent on participation in processes that are little more than "window dressing."

Even more fundamental a constraint on environmental interest group effectiveness is the environmentalists' lack of traditional political power. Only partially related to a group's level of organization, this factor is relatively neglected by Pross, while it is a major theme in the works of other commentators including Mancur Olson (1965) and Douglas Amy (1987). If one party to a structured conflict resolution process has fewer ways of defending itself against a negative decision than another - that is, weaker sanctions against its adversaries - then the process is unbalanced. The group with less power to sanction has less incentive to play by the rules. At the outset of the South Moresby conflict, industry held the sanctions of jobs and revenue; government held the power of final say over land use and allocation, including the discretionary powers of the Forest Minister; and wilderness proponents held the power of support from portions of the Queen Charlottes community and affinity groups. The dynamics of decision-making within the policy community, in which information was withheld by the sub-government and decisions were made with little respect for the advice of planning committees, demonstrated to the wilderness proponents that their powers were not enough.

Outside the Policy Community

Policy Processes in the Broader Environment

Mainly because of their initially weak position in relation to the entrenched powers of the forestry sub-government, the wilderness proponents in the South Moresby conflict found that "the routes formally established by the politicians for [decision-making] purposes had proven totally inadequate" (Dearden 1984, 70). With the co-operation of national and international groups, and the media, the lobby sought and attained the back-up sanctioning power of mass public support. The issue thus "escaped" the policy community. In the final analysis, "the park had been established, not through the usual channels and procedures of park systems planning and bureaucratic structures, but by a wave of mass public support rising to such a crescendo that the politicians had no alternative but to be carried along on the flotsam and jetsam of public will" (Dearden 1984, 62). This conclusion is consistent with Lowe and Goyder's (1983, 75) observation that lobbying skills today "depend less on personal influence and string-pulling behind the scenes, more on an open, adversarial approach; less on the censure of educated taste, more on direct appeals to popular opinion as a sanction against unsuitable development proposals." (Although "string-pulling behind the scenes" was certainly an important strategy in the final hours of the South Moresby campaign.)

Industry participants surmised in retrospect that a successful defense of what was in their view a suitable development proposal would have depended on similar tactics. In the words of the President of WFP, "We always believed there was

enough room for logging and wilderness preserves. There could have been peaceful co-existence. We lost because we didn't tell our story" (Western Report 1987, 8). The manager of the company's Queen Charlotte operations concurs: "We fought the battle right here while the other side went to the streets of Toronto. I guess that's how it's done" (Western Report 1987, 4).

The bitterness of industry opinion on the South Moresby experience reflects both imagined and real failures of policy-making in the political forum of the broader environment. A strong sense that the premier "sold out" the industry to a constituency based in central Canada suggests a risk that trade-offs between interest groups may be based on political exigencies that are unfair to local interests, or simply to the less vocal lobby group. The current proliferation of "share" groups and the "multiple use" or "wise use" movement is motivated by such reasoning. Party politics and looming elections can lead to short-term thinking amongst cabinet ministers who may neglect the advice of their bureaucrats and give inordinate consideration to the opinion of pressure groups - well-informed or not. Certainly, the findings of extensive studies and planning exercises undertaken by agencies involved in South Moresby were never seriously considered by provincial politicians. Finally, political jockeying for position and fear of having to make unpopular decisions can lead to long periods of uncertainty when the plans of those with a stake in the area under dispute have to be "put on hold". When investments are made based on contractual expectations that are never realized, the settlement of losses later proves costly and problematic in negotiation.

At present the environmentalists and native people appear to have the strategic advantage in the forum of national politics and the media because their tactics are better suited to that milieu. Nevertheless, the hazards of political maneuvering apply to these interest groups as well. Combined with the additional expense of the strategies employed outside the policy community, political risks are serious enough deterrents that these groups will usually still seek to have their concerns addressed within the policy community before mounting a broader-scale campaign.

Conflicting Worldviews

The gulf between the adversaries in the South Moresby debate was of such magnitude and so symptomatic of opposing worldviews in North America today that the transition of the controversy from the policy community into the broader environment was less dependent on the strategies of the wilderness lobby than it might otherwise have been. At one extreme lay the spiritual and nationalistic perspective of the Haida people: "somewhere in the warrens of rooms and confining corridors of Canada's capitals is an altar carved with the creed, 'Go forth and subdue the earth.' All that stands between that altar and Haida Gwaii is a small nation of people who know their responsibility towards a small and precious piece of Earth" (Yelthadaas 1988, 15). The environmentalist viewpoint, though based more in ecosystemic than cultural foundations, has increasingly reflected a similar sense of stewardship, and of stridency. At the other extreme lay the industry outlook: "[The outcome is] a nightmare and I worry about the future of logging in B.C." (Western Report 1987, 4); and the perspective of the Minister of Forests: the national park proposal "is 'shortsighted' and a 'shame' because it reduces the annual allowable cut of timber in the province" (Baldrey 2 June 1988).

The debates over the value of the unlogged forests of South Moresby have yet to be resolved, as the compensation claims of the forest companies are currently under contentious negotiation. But whatever price tag is decided, it is unlikely that

agreement will be reached on the values ultimately gained or lost. The Resource Planning Team (1983, 25) observed that "foregoing immediate economic benefits does not mean that those benefits will be permanently lost. Rather, they may be considered to be deferred for future generations to decide upon." The Forests Minister would disagree: in his opinion the conservation decision was "a loss to all following generations of British Columbians" (Baldrey 2 June 1988). Industry expects that the park will not only be an economic loss but an ongoing drain: "the area will end up being a 'tax consuming monster'" (Parfitt 19 July 1989). And the federal Environment Minister, in his vision of sustainable development, saw economic gain as virtually uncompromised: "Instead of clashing fatally, environmental and economic goals were finally reconciled" (Bohn 19 Oct. 1987). Perhaps the Resource Planning Team (1983, 25-26) was closest to the truth in its conclusion, "that there is at present no satisfactory analytical model for the comparison of economic and non-economic values. ... traditional economic measures of value may be easily and widely misinterpreted."

Towards a New Policy Paradigm

Interest Group Activism as the Catalyst for Social Learning

According to Lester Milbrath (1984), the opposing worldviews described above are not simply competing, contemporary perspectives. Rather, the non-economic, ecosystemic ethic is ascending and the industrial one is on the decline, largely due to the work of environmental activists. Recent polls in Canada reveal an unprecedented public concern for the environment and a trust in information from environmental groups over that of government and industry (Environics poll reported in Parfitt 27 May 1989). Lowe and Goyder (1983, 79) and Pross regard the activities of groups that seek fundamental changes to the status quo as "a source of systemic renewal, even though challenges to conventional wisdom, however apt, are seldom welcomed by those who hold power" (Pross 1987, 150). Some observers of the South Moresby conflict see its history in the same light, as "an escalation in resistance to environmentally and culturally destructive resource development which seems to reflect an underlying social transition" (Grzybowski 1985, 61). This transition is achieved through a process of social learning.

Pinkerton (1983) portrays the early activities of the attentive public in the Queen Charlottes as a learning process during which the community became aware of: the contractual obligations of forest companies, the inadequacies of forest management practices, the public's right to demand sound management of Crown lands and access to information on that management, and the public's ability to exercise these rights through lobbying and legal pressure. At the national level, the South Moresby debate has similarly provided a catalyst for learning about forest management: "The overwhelming public support [for the South Moresby wilderness advocates], worldwide, has given a new legitimacy to public scrutiny of the forest industry and just how well our governments are looking after the values of our forests, including timber and wilderness" (Nixon 1987,12).

The evolution of the Haida's position on the title issue into a clear expression of readiness to assume authority is another important part of the social learning process connected with the South Moresby debate. The Haida's experience again reflects a broader phenomenon, in which native people in many parts of the world "have demonstrated their ability to 'bootstrap' themselves into a position of knowledge, expertise, and political sophistication" (Grzybowski and Slocombe 1988, 475). As native peoples' concerns rise in profile, growing numbers of Canadians are

viewing government's reluctance to address them as unacceptable and are supporting demands for a response. An unlikely ally in the issue is the forest industry itself - which has quietly lobbied the provincial cabinet to negotiate land claims. The industry is apparently exasperated by the seemingly endless confrontations and legal actions which have blocked access to forest assets in deference to the unresolved title issue (Broadhead, pers. comm. 1990).

From Social Change to Change in Policy-Making

A representative of the Forest Information Project, a public research group, sees reflected in the public's growing awareness of forest management principles the kind of value shift described by Milbrath: "The idea that a tree has no value unless it can be turned into profit is a thing of the past, and the corporations are going to have to adjust to people's changing concerns" (quoted in Bankes 1988, 124). The mounting tension between emerging societal priorities and the ways in which the policy community does business can only be relieved through modification of the institutions of policy-making. Signs of institutional and political change as a result of environmental activism are appearing. For example, "Just days before the [Queen Charlottes] agreement was signed, the B.C. Forest Act was changed to make it legal to leave some trees standing in a commercial forest if that provides a recreational benefit. Such a legislative change would not have happened without South Moresby" (Nixon 1987, 12). More recently, public outcry has forced the Ministry of Forests to reconsider its policy of strengthening industry's tenure over the forest resource; and a Forest Resources Commission has been appointed to address the problems that pervade forest land management in B.C. Worldwide, the campaigns of environmental groups have aroused public opinion, and decision-makers are increasingly obliged to "consider carefully what the public is likely to tolerate or reject in terms of environmental impact" (Lowe and Goyder 1983, 79). Previously recalcitrant government agencies and companies now have no choice but to respond to environmentalists' concerns in the public forum.

However, political adjustments to emerging environmental priorities arrive in small increments, and in the area of native rights, progress has been even slower. Entrenchment of powers with superior organizational resources means that environmental concessions are invariably hard won. The outcome is that the contribution of the groups that challenge the policy status quo "is far less significant and insightful than their origins and composition warrant. Their limited role may be a comfort to sub-governments, but restricts the benefits the polity at large can derive from group politics" (Pross 1986, 175). Furthermore, the media-oriented political arena in which the battles are waged is a flawed forum for the fair and rational resolution of environmental conflicts.

In reaction to the pervasive inadequacy of current decision making processes many environmentalists, backed by changing social values, are seeking more fundamental, systemic change. Their dedication "stems ... from a conviction that the conventional wisdom is in error and that a new policy paradigm must be put in place" (Pross 1986, 150). Somehow this new paradigm must combine the best of policy processes from inside and outside the policy community. It should be capable of utilizing the expertise of the bureaucracy while accommodating advice from the public, and facilitating informed input from interest groups. It should not permit arbitrary, shortsighted decisions, yet it should respond to changing societal priorities. It should provide a fair hearing of both local and broader-scale concerns in forums that encourage dialogue rather than deadlock. Finally, the new way of making policy must not be biased either towards the "vested interests" or the

"squeaky wheels". It must be as accessible to the weak and the unorganized as to the powerful and the bureaucratised. These are the ideals against which a new policy paradigm has to be measured, wherever alternatives are sought - in the universities, in native tradition, in the deliberations of the Forest Resources Commission or in the communities that depend on the wisdom of the new approach.

APPENDIX: Chronology of Main Decisions and Events

Note: This chronology was assembled from several sources, some of which conflicted on the timing of events. Some dates were extrapolated from contextual evidence. This list therefore may contain errors.

October 1974 - ITT-Rayonier Canada (B.C.) Ltd., holder of Tree Farm Licence #24, proposes to begin logging on Burnaby Island. Permission is denied and logging is begun on Lyell Island.

October 1974 - Thom Henley and Gary Edenshaw, in Masset, form the Islands Protection Committee.

November 1974 - meeting in Skidegate between parties in the conflict; plan to log Burnaby Island is deferred

February 1975 - petition (500 signatures of island residents) to provincial Legislature for moratorium on all logging in the Wilderness Proposal area

April 1975 - ELUC instructs its Secretariat to prepare an overview study of the wilderness proposal; July 1976 Secretariat staff visit Moresby.

Spring 1977 - Ministry of Forest's Queen Charlotte Islands Public Advisory Committee to the Forest Service formed

November 1977 - Second All-Islands Symposium, sponsored by IPS on "Resource Conflict in the South Moresby Wilderness Proposal" passes resolution to call for public hearings into the renewal of TFL #24

May 1978 - new Forest Act introduced, passed in June 1978

January 1979 - IPS, etc. file joint petition in Supreme court of B.C. against the Minister of Forests

March 1979 - ELUC Overview Study is released recommending moratorium on logging in most areas; Forest Service organizes the South Moresby Resource Planning Team

May 1979 - TFL #24 renewed for 25 years; Social Credit party re-elected

September 1979 - final meeting of Public Advisory Committee

October 1979 - landslides damage clearcut watersheds throughout Queen Charlottes

January 1980 - petitioners return to court and are dismissed

1980 - Rayonier bought out by consortium of companies called Western Forest Products

1981 - the Haida submit their formal land claim to the federal government

1982 - Anthony Island implemented as UNESCO World Heritage Cultural Site

1983 - South Moresby Resource Planning Team submits its South Moresby Land Use Alternatives report to the provincial government; report is released in February 1984

1984 - IFS publishes Islands at the Edge

January 1985 - permission granted to WFP to log Lyell Island

February 1985 - federal and B.C. governments express willingness to enter into discussions over creation of park

May 1985 - Parks Minister Anthony Brummet proposes planning option 1-A

October, November 1985 - Haida blockade of WFP logging on Lyell Island

November 1985 - Crombie and McMillan offer to help resolve the dispute; Wilderness Advisory Committee appointed

January 1986 - rallies held in Sandspit by Moresby Island Concerned Citizens Coalition

January 1986 - Minister of Forests Waterland resigns over conflict of interest involving tax shelter in WFP mill

1986 - "Save South Moresby Caravan" crosses Canada

March 1986 - WAC makes recommendations

July 1986 - go-ahead to log Lyell Island given by Forest Minister on recommendation of WAC

July 1986 - Haida renounce citizenship in telegram to Mulroney

December 1986 - Ministry approves 5-year cutting plan for Lyell Island, then imposes logging moratorium exempting only the northern quarter of the Island

July 1987 - Memorandum of Understanding reached between provincial and federal governments

July 1988 - Memorandum of Agreement signed by provincial and federal governments

July 1988 - Haida threaten closure of area to visitors

January 1989 - Haida declare self-rule; issue own passports; withdraw from land claims process

February 1989 - Haida withdraw from park management negotiations

April 1989 - federal Minister of the Environment holds discussions with Haida

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